The Iraq-al-Qaeda link

Timeline

1. Apr 2001 · Context

   The date of the reported Prague meeting between Atta and an Iraqi intelligence officer. The FBI placed Atta in the United States that week, per Senator Levin's 2004 summary.

2. 9 Dec 2001 · It worked

   On Meet the Press Cheney says the Prague meeting is "pretty well confirmed" (as quoted in Senator Levin's 8 July 2004 Senate remarks).

3. Aug-Sep 2002 · It worked

   Feith's unit briefs Rumsfeld and senior CIA officials in August and the White House in September. The Inspector General's account, as reported by the Christian Science Monitor, has the wording shifting from "one indication" in the briefing to Rumsfeld to "some indications of possible" Iraqi coordination in the White House version. Edelman's response argued that none of the versions was an "assessment of any sort".

4. 9 Jan 2004 · It worked

   Cheney says the alleged meeting "possibly tied the two together to 9/11" and "we've never been able to collect any more information on that".

5. 9 Mar 2004 · Exposed

   CIA Director Tenet answers: "Although we cannot rule it out, we are increasingly skeptical that such a meeting occurred."

6. 16 Jun 2004 · Exposed

   The 9/11 Commission staff report: "We have no credible evidence that Iraq and al-Qaida cooperated on attacks against the United States"; later contacts "do not appear to have resulted in a collaborative relationship". On Prague: "We do not believe that such a meeting occurred."

7. 17 Jun 2004 · It worked

   Cheney, days after claiming "long-established ties" between Saddam and al-Qaeda, says on CNBC: "We have never been able to prove that there was a connection there on 9/11."

8. 8-9 Feb 2007 · Exposed

   Senator Levin releases portions of the Pentagon Inspector General's report. It calls the policy office's analysis "reporting of dubious quality or reliability" and finds the office "was predisposed to finding a significant relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda". Acting IG Thomas Gimble found the actions not illegal; some intelligence activities were inappropriate.

The same meeting was "pretty well confirmed" in 2001 and "never been proven; it's never been refuted" in 2004, after the CIA said it was "increasingly skeptical" it happened.

“We do not believe that such a meeting occurred.”

The playbook

1. 1

   Laundered intelligence

   The policy office ran what the Inspector General called "an alternative intelligence assessment process", producing products outside the regular intelligence channels, in Senator Rockefeller's words; the IG found some of the activity inappropriate but not illegal.

2. 2

   Borrowed authority

   The vice president described the Prague meeting as "pretty well confirmed" when intelligence agencies had not confirmed it.

3. 3

   Trusted repeaters

   The same claim was repeated by senior officials in public and in briefings to the Secretary of Defense, CIA and White House.

4. 4

   Win before the facts

   The briefings of August and September 2002 came before the March 2003 invasion; the Commission and IG findings came in 2004 and 2007.

Through the FATE framework

• Focus6/10

  A single meeting was kept in view as the link between the 9/11 attacks and Iraq.

• Authority8/10

  Statements came from the vice president and a Pentagon policy office, against the intelligence community's view that the two were unlikely allies.

• Tribe6/10

  It folded Saddam Hussein into the enemy already named after 9/11.

• Emotion8/10

  It tied a country to the grief and fear of 11 September 2001.

Propaganda techniques used

• Guilt by Association
• Appeal to Authority
• Repetition
• Appeal to Fear/Prejudice

Same playbook today