Intelligence laundering · 2003 · US, Germany, Iraq

Curveball

An Iraqi defector in German custody, codenamed Curveball, described mobile biological weapons laboratories. His account reached US analysts through the German BND, was used in the October 2002 intelligence estimate, and was cited by Colin Powell at the UN on 5 February 2003 as an "eye witness" account. Doubts had been raised inside the CIA. In 2011 he told the Guardian he had made it up to help topple Saddam. The war and the claims were real; the Iraq Survey Group and Silberman-Robb found no active biological weapons programme.

A slide titled "Mobile Production Facilities For Biological Agents" showing a computer-drawn diagram of trucks carrying fermentation tanks, spray dryers and a filling machine.
Slide shown by Colin Powell to the UN Security Council on 5 February 2003, a diagram of alleged mobile biological weapons laboratories. The claim rested chiefly on Curveball. Credit: US Department of State, via Wikimedia Commons. License: Public domain.
Run by
One defector
Rafid Ahmed Alwan al-Janabi, who told the Guardian in 2011 that he fabricated the account to topple Saddam; relayed by Germany's BND
Produced by the source, the only ones from an informant claiming to have worked in mobile labs
100+ reports
Per NBC News (2006); McLaughlin put it at "close to a hundred reports"
Powell cites the account to the UN Security Council
5 Feb 2003
The invasion followed in March 2003; US officials partly relied on his information
Time to exposure
2005 / 2011
The Silberman-Robb commission reported on 31 March 2005; Alwan publicly admitted lying in February 2011

Timeline

  1. Nov 1999 · Context

    Alwan arrives in Munich from North Africa and requests asylum. German foreign intelligence (BND) takes him under its vetting, per the National Security Archive.

  2. 2000 · It worked

    The BND shares its reporting with the Defense Intelligence Agency, which passes it on to the CIA. Alwan says German intelligence approached him in March 2000 and that he described mobile bioweapons trucks throughout that year.

  3. Oct 2002 · It worked

    The National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi weapons programmes draws on the reporting. Tyler Drumheller, then CIA Europe chief, relays a German warning about the source to his superiors. Deputy Director John McLaughlin later said no one had made such doubts clear to him.

  4. 20 Dec 2002 · Context

    A cable from the Berlin station includes a letter from BND president August Henning saying Curveball would not go public and the BND would not allow direct US access. Tenet says he never saw the letter.

  5. 28 Jan 2003 · It worked

    President Bush's State of the Union address describes mobile labs in detail, according to NBC News.

  6. 4-5 Feb 2003 · It worked

    Drumheller says he warned Tenet by phone on 4 February. Tenet and McLaughlin brief Powell that day and express confidence in the mobile-lab story. On 5 February Powell tells the UN: "We have firsthand descriptions of biological weapons factories on wheels and on rails," from "an Iraqi chemical engineer who supervised one of these facilities".

  7. Late summer 2003 · Exposed

    Per NBC News, Tenet tells Powell the Curveball story has fallen apart.

  8. 31 Mar 2005 · Exposed

    The presidential commission co-chaired by Laurence Silberman and Charles Robb reports. The National Security Archive summarises its finding as that the intelligence community "seriously misjudged" Iraq's biological capabilities, citing over-reliance on Curveball. McLaughlin says on 1 April that had he known, "I would never have permitted the use of such material by the Secretary".

  9. 4 Nov 2007 · Exposed

    CBS's 60 Minutes identifies Curveball as Rafid Ahmed Alwan.

  10. 15 Feb 2011 · Exposed

    The Guardian publishes an interview in which Alwan says: "They gave me this chance. I had the chance to fabricate something to topple the regime."

The only American known to have met him before the invasion doubted he was who he said he was; the speech called him an eyewitness and said every statement was backed by "solid sources".

“I had the chance to fabricate something to topple the regime.”

Rafid Ahmed Alwan al-Janabi ("Curveball"), Guardian interview, 15 February 2011, as reported by NBC News

The playbook

  1. 1

    Laundered intelligence

    A single source's account moved from the BND to the DIA to the CIA to a national estimate, losing the warnings on the way, until it read as established fact.

  2. 2

    Unverifiable victim

    The BND did not allow US officers access to him, so the claim could not be tested by the people relying on it; the one DIA officer who met him had doubts.

  3. 3

    Borrowed authority

    Powell presented the account at the UN as first-hand testimony from a named-by-role engineer and said every statement was backed by solid sources.

  4. 4

    Suppress the correction

    Drumheller says he crossed the claim out of Powell's draft and warned Tenet; it was reinserted. Whether senior officials heard these warnings is disputed.

Through the FATE framework

  • Focus6/10

    Mobile weapons labs gave a concrete, imaginable threat to organise the case for war around.

  • Authority8/10

    A Secretary of State at the UN and an intelligence estimate vouched for an account no US officer had tested.

  • Tribe4/10

    It rested on the divide between Saddam's Iraq and the coalition more than on any in-group appeal.

  • Emotion7/10

    Germ weapons that could be moved on trucks and trains carried fear of an unseen, mobile threat.

Propaganda techniques used

Same playbook today

The same playbook can be run by anyone, on any side. We list every current PSYOP that matches Curveball, whoever is behind it.

No live PSYOP we track matches this playbook right now. When one does, it will appear here.